David Woods

Wednesday Section 3-4:50

TA: David Levy

203193194

 

Browning Paper

 

            While Major Wilhelm Trapp’s initial distaste and anguish over the murdering of the Jews lends credence to the fact that he should not be held accountable for what happened to them, the atrocities his men committed, especially the massacre of the Jews from the Kock ghetto, are his responsibility as leader.  He was guilty of crimes against humanity.  He could have refused the assignment to kill the Jews; instead, he obeyed the orders from above despite his personal qualms.  Later on, having to issue a reprisal against the Polish town of Talcyn for the killing of Sergeant Jobst, he chose to kill many more Jews than Poles to “alienate the local population as little as possible.” (Browning, 101.)  Rather than alienate the Poles, some of whom were most likely responsible for the killing, he chose to kill 180 Jews, along with only 78 Poles.  These Jews were locked up in a ghetto, so they could not have been responsible for the killing.  This alone is enough to convict a man of crimes against humanity.  It also demonstrates his slowly forming indifference to the killing of the Jews; while at the beginning he was in tears about the murders, here he is sacrificing them for expedience.  Browning doesn’t make this point; he simply offers up what was done and lets the reader interpret it.  He writes at great length about Trapp’s inner turmoil at the beginning, but he offers no speculation about his thought processes during the Kock ghetto massacre.  It seems as if he is almost trying to gloss over that so as to cast Trapp in a better light.

            The reason Trapp participated in the Holocaust is a reason exemplified by most defendants at the Nuremberg Trials: he was ordered.  Judging by his initial reaction to the murders in Jozefow, he was not a supporter of the Holocaust.  But also by his reaction, one can see his reasons for his participation.  “’Oh God, why did I have to be given these orders…Man, some jobs don’t suit me.  But orders are orders.’” (Browning, 58.)  Trapp was not a supporter of the Holocaust, but he obeyed his orders, because that was what he was trained to do as a soldier. 

            Some might say that Trapp, because he gave his men the option of refusal, should not be guilty of crimes against humanity.  But this is a half-measure.  He could have refused this assignment to his superiors, as some of his men did to him.  He knew the consequences of what was going on, judging by such statements as “’If this Jewish business is ever avenged on earth, then have mercy on us Germans.’” (Browning, 58.)   Simply because he offered his men the option of refusal doesn’t alleviate his guilt.  He allowed it to happen under his command; as a military commander, he is responsible for what goes on in his command.  A man should have moral qualms about murdering defenseless people; the fact that Trapp doesn’t act on his moral qualms is the damning fact in his case.  His participation, or lack thereof, in the Holocaust would not have changed it very much at all, but that doesn’t mean he’s still not culpable for what went on in his battalion.

            Browning seems as if he would be a defender of Trapp.  He repeatedly describes Trapp’s sorrow at the thought of killing the Jews, and steers away from Trapp’s actions that point toward his guilt.  While he wouldn’t defend Trapp’s actions, he would defend Trapp as a person.  All in all, though, Trapp can be shown to be guilt of crimes against humanity because he simply does not act on his moral qualms and, in fact, grows indifferent to the killings as time goes on.