David Woods
Wednesday Section 3-4:50
TA: David Levy
203193194
Browning Paper
While
Major Wilhelm Trapp’s initial distaste and anguish over the murdering of the
Jews lends credence to the fact that he should not be held accountable for what
happened to them, the atrocities his men committed, especially the massacre of
the Jews from the Kock ghetto, are his responsibility as leader. He was guilty of crimes against
humanity. He could have refused the
assignment to kill the Jews; instead, he obeyed the orders from above despite
his personal qualms. Later on, having to
issue a reprisal against the Polish town of Talcyn for the killing of Sergeant
Jobst, he chose to kill many more Jews than Poles to “alienate the local
population as little as possible.” (Browning, 101.) Rather than alienate the Poles, some of whom
were most likely responsible for the killing, he chose to kill 180 Jews, along
with only 78 Poles. These Jews were locked
up in a ghetto, so they could not have been responsible for the killing. This alone is enough to convict a man of
crimes against humanity. It also
demonstrates his slowly forming indifference to the killing of the Jews; while
at the beginning he was in tears about the murders, here he is sacrificing them
for expedience. Browning doesn’t make
this point; he simply offers up what was done and lets the reader interpret
it. He writes at great length about
Trapp’s inner turmoil at the beginning, but he offers no speculation about his
thought processes during the Kock ghetto massacre. It seems as if he is almost trying to gloss
over that so as to cast Trapp in a better light.
The
reason Trapp participated in the Holocaust is a reason exemplified by most
defendants at the Nuremberg Trials: he was ordered. Judging by his initial reaction to the
murders in Jozefow, he was not a supporter of the Holocaust. But also by his reaction, one can see his
reasons for his participation. “’Oh God,
why did I have to be given these orders…Man, some jobs don’t suit me. But orders are orders.’” (Browning, 58.) Trapp was not a supporter of the Holocaust,
but he obeyed his orders, because that was what he was trained to do as a
soldier.
Some
might say that Trapp, because he gave his men the option of refusal, should not
be guilty of crimes against humanity.
But this is a half-measure. He
could have refused this assignment to his superiors, as some of his men did to
him. He knew the consequences of what
was going on, judging by such statements as “’If this Jewish business is ever
avenged on earth, then have mercy on us Germans.’” (Browning, 58.) Simply because he offered his men the option
of refusal doesn’t alleviate his guilt.
He allowed it to happen under his command; as a military commander, he
is responsible for what goes on in his command.
A man should have moral qualms about murdering
defenseless people; the fact that Trapp doesn’t act on his moral qualms is the
damning fact in his case. His
participation, or lack thereof, in the Holocaust would not have changed it very
much at all, but that doesn’t mean he’s still not culpable for what went on in
his battalion.
Browning
seems as if he would be a defender of Trapp.
He repeatedly describes Trapp’s sorrow at the thought of killing the
Jews, and steers away from Trapp’s actions that point toward his guilt. While he wouldn’t defend Trapp’s actions, he
would defend Trapp as a person. All in
all, though, Trapp can be shown to be guilt of crimes against humanity because
he simply does not act on his moral qualms and, in fact, grows indifferent to
the killings as time goes on.